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Belgrade
BREAKUP
Wracked by civil war, Yugoslavia now looks ungovernable. 
Yet the roots of the crisis lie deep in the Titoist past. 
Paul Hockenos spoke to Yugoslavia's most famous 
dissident, Milovan Djilas, about the country's impasse
and its origins.
H H  ilovan Djilas, 79, is Yugoslavia's most 
I , y , I famous former dissident. In 1932, the 
[  j  | young Montenegrin joined the then- 
w m m m  illegal Communist Party of Yugos­
lavia and later led the World War Two 
underground resistance as a partisan general. 
After the war, Djilas was Tito's right-hand man 
until his democratic objections to Yugoslavia's 
course precipitated his expulsion from the party 
in 1954. As an outspoken critic of the regime, his 
views and numerous books cost him ten years' 
imprisonment Only in May 1989 did he achieve 
de facto rehabilitation when he began to appear 
openly in the media.
As one of postwar Yugoslavia's founding fathers, how 
do you feel today as you witness the country's violent 
collapse?
I had long predicted the downfall of Tito's centralised 
\Ugoslavia. Of course, I didn't suppose that the state
would disintegrate so rapidly—although, unlike the 
Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, the evolution of the 
system here has been in progress for some time. I thought 
that after so many years of dictatorship the initial reaction 
of people would be more democratic. I knew, of course, 
that nationalism would play a great role in Yugoslavia, 
but I didn't foresee it being this strong.
Yet, single party rule is over and democratic elections 
have been held in every republic...
Certainly, elections marked the beginning of a process of 
democratisation. But the end of communist rule brought 
different nationalistic movements to power in every 
republic in Yugoslavia. Regardless of their ideological 
pretences, there are no essential differences between the 
regimes in the six Yugoslav republics. While the govern­
ments are democratically elected, the parliaments are 
ineffectual and the oppositions everywhere are very 
weak. The means of information are by and large tightly 
controlled. In Belgrade and Zagreb, as well as Skopje and 
Ljubljana, what we have now are autocratic nationalistic 
governments in power.
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How do yon explain the intensity and ferocity of 
nationalism In Yugoslavia today?
Nationalism, of course, has deep roots here. The Croats, for 
example, have been obsessed with the creation of their own 
state since the 13th century. But four decades of communist 
dictatorship haven't helped any. The communists blocked 
the growth of a democratic consciousness here by suppress­
ing every form of opposition—particularly democratic op­
position.
Nationalism was also suppressed but, unlike democracy, it 
is a spontaneous movement. In the new political space, 
nationalist populist groups found the national ideologies 
easy to manipulate. The Serb and Croat ruling parties 
launched fierce nationalistic campaigns against one 
another that fanned hatred and laid the basis for military 
conflict
So, the break-up of post-Tito Yugoslavia was inevitable?
In its communist form—yes. Maybe if Tito had been more 
elastic much earlier on, less orthodox in his ideology, things 
would look different today. I advocated a step by step 
process of democratisation in the early 1950s. But Tito was 
a dictator, and dictators demand full control.
War is already a reality. What are your thoughts as Yugos­
lavia slides ever deeper into civil war again after 45 years?
This is a crazy war because it is one that nobody will win. 
Even if we imagine a Serbian or Croatian victory, the essen­
tial problems will remain the same. Let's say that Serbia 
wins and takes Croatian land, Croatia will always be eager 
to take that territory back again. Of course, I am very 
worried and I ask myself what can I do. But I'm too old now 
to participate in politics. There isn't a social democratic 
organisation that suits me at the moment and I have no 
desire to serve any particular leadership.
Many observers today lay the brunt of the blame at the 
feet of the Serbian government. Can one speak of Serbia 
as the aggressor, pressing for a Greater Serbia at the 
tenitorialexpense of the other republics?
No side is exclusively guilty. During elections last year, the 
leader of the nationalistic Croat party, now Croat President 
Franjo Tudjman, expressed his intention to create a Greater 
Croatia. That meant taking parts of Bosnia, as well as Serbia 
and Montenegro. Now, because they have suffered great 
losses on the battlefield, they hope simply to maintain 
Croatia's present frontiers. Under the pretext of defending 
the Serb minority there, the Serbian leadership—and now 
the army too—is attacking some parts of northeastern 
Croatia, where Croats constitute the majori ty of the popula­
tion. From my point of view this is a war of invasion.
The story is somewhat different in the Krajina region of 
southern Croatia, where Serbs in fact constitute the 
majority. The Serbs there do have a right to some form of 
autonomy which the newly-elected Croat government 
denied them. They felt endangered, and the Serbs are a
people very strongly inclined to protect the Serbian 
minority in Croatia. The memories of the Ustashe [World 
War Two Croatian fascists] massacres are still very much 
alive in the Serb consciousness.
Yet surely Serbia's intentions to impose its hegemony 
over large parts of Yugoslavia has been clear for some 
time now.
Serbia, as a republic, is not formally involved in the conflict. 
It was the Serbian minority in Croatia that started to revolt 
and the Croatian militia suppressed them. In the beginning, 
the army was more or less neutral. Nevertheless, the Serbs 
can't justify such a large military response. The political 
leadership of Krajina which, indeed, is backed by Serbia 
seems intent on enlarging its own ethnic territory. They are 
even speaking of the Dalmatian port of Zadar as Serbian.
The aims of Serbia's President Milosevic are still unclear. 
Although his rhetoric is that of a united Yugoslavia, his 
moves to expand Serbian influence are anti-Yugoslav. But 
that doesn't necessarily mean that he wouldn't settle for 
national rights and autonomy for the Serb minorities in a 
reworked Yugoslavia. I am afraid, however, that he is more 
inclined to enlarge Serbia which implicitly spells war in 
Croatia as well as in neighbouring Bosnia and elsewhere, 
such as the overwhelming ethnic Albanian province of 
Kosovo, If there is a rebellion in Kosovo, Albania itself will
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go to war. Albania may be weak and demoralised, but 
Albanians in Kosovo are unanimous and intensely in­
spired along national lines.
Croatia and Slovenia both base their claims to inde­
pendence on the right of nations to self-determination. 
The application of this right is obviously problematic In 
Buch ethnically mixed regions as Croatia and Bosnia. But, 
on the other hand, can it be denied?
The republics’ positions are 
all riddled with hypocrisy
Theoretically, everybody has this right but, in practice, we 
are not so free. Neither Croatia nor Bosnia can separate 
without sparking war. If Croatia has the right to self-deter­
mination, say the Serbs, then so does the Serb minority— 
and they will elect to join Serbia proper. The republics' 
different positions are all riddled with hypocrisy. While the 
Serbs demand the right to separate from Croatia, they deny 
the same prerogative to the Albanians in Kosovo. Since 
Slovenia is ethnically homogeneous, and her present 
republican frontiers are in harmony with her ethnic bor­
ders, she can become independent. Macedonia, maybe, can 
too, but it will find itself threatened from the Bulgarian and 
Albanian side as well as Serbian. Frontiers are nearly im­
possible to define within Yugoslavia. But, then, the ques­
tion of borders is the problem of all of Europe, not only 
Yugoslavia.
As the war in Croatia has escalated, the federal army has 
intervened with increasing force on behalf of the Serbs. 
How do you explain this development?
Longer than any other institution in Yugoslavia, the army 
stuck by the old communi st ideology of federal Yugoslavia. 
Yet, with time, even it began to understand that this was 
obsolete. The independence drives of the republics 
prompted a belated but parallel disintegration within the 
army. The military hierarchy simply replaced their com­
munist values with nationalist orientations. Now all 
republics, with the exception of Serbia, insist upon their 
own republican army. The generals from Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Croatia and Bosnian are actively promoting 
desertion from the army. Thus, although the army is for­
mally Yugoslav, in practice it is ever more Serbian. Under 
the pretext of maintaining a federal Yugoslavia, the army 
is, in fact, backing the Serbs in Croatia.
The outlook appears so grim. Is a resolution to the crisis 
anywhere in sight?
Unless some qualitatively new factors arise, I don't see this 
war coming to an end in the near future. At the same time.
I still don't believe that an all-out Balkan war is inevitable. 
The people are not enthusiastic about the war, even in 
Serbia.
The European institutions have a key role to play in Yugos­
lavia. The latest decision to hold a peace conference for 
Yugoslavia is positive. In contrast to earlier initiatives that 
were empty, this move promises something concrete. I've 
been extrem ely disappointed with the European 
diplomacy until now. There haven't been any real achieve­
ments, only propositions, declarations and promises. The 
German and Austrian moves to recognise Slovenian and 
Croatian independence had negative repercussions. On 
the one hand, they encouraged Croats to continue the civil 
war as a means to win international recognition. On the 
other hand, the possibility of an independent Croatia only 
frightened the Serb minority further, prompting them to 
step up their revolt.
How, then, do you envision the nations and ethnic 
minorities of Yugoslavia living together?
The one way out for Yugoslavia is to move itself towards 
a liberal, democratic state. I envision a completely new 
structure for Yugoslavia—something between federation 
and confederation. That means a state organised with com­
pletely independent life for equal republics and, at the 
same time, with a strong centre. The republics must agree 
upon a common army, common monetary and foreign 
policy, and common guaranteed human rights.
But isn't it already too late for this? Hasn't a united 
Yugoslavia already been rejected?
It can't be too late because there isn't any other way to 
avoid all-out war. A structure similar to the one I have in 
mind was basically proposed last month by the presidents 
of Bosnia and Macedonia. All the republican leaders 
agreed but, then, the next day, some of them backed away.
Yugoslavs watched the recent crisis in the Soviet Union 
with particular interest. How have the events there af­
fected Yugoslavia?
It was telling that the Serbian leadership was the only 
government in Europe that didn't condemn the putsch. In 
a similar boat, the Soviet Union had sheltered Serbia and 
army hardliners. I think Moscow will now adopt a position 
closer to that of the West Europeans, thus isolating Serbia 
even more.
Yugoslavia could use its own Gorbachev today. But neither 
is that person in sight nor, honestly, do I feel that he or she 
could really counter the tide of nationalism here. I think 
that the crisis in the Soviet Union will resolve itself more 
easily than in Yugoslavia.
PAUL HOCKENOS writes for A IR  from his base in 
Budapest.
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